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 Successful organizations can be extraordinarily persistent and creative in denying the obvious, ignoring signals that suggest a need to challenge key 
strategic assumptions� The U�S� military has been the world’s unrivaled force for 
twenty-five years, even lacking a peer competitor in some domains—naval op-
erations, for example—since 1943� A danger of such sustained success is that the 
military might come to view these strategic assumptions not as ideas requiring 
continual reassessment but as enduring laws� The current and future strategic 
environments demand that the military innovate and question its strategic as-
sumptions, not because we know that they are wrong, but because every theory of 
competition eventually succumbs to new facts�1 The military should be extremely 
sensitive to the risks of believing things that are 
no longer (or may never have been) true; yet it is 
particularly vulnerable to persistent denial, and 
the wartime consequences of such errors are dire� 
These assertions are not ours� The 2014 Qua-
drennial Defense Review (QDR) mandates that 
innovation within the Department of Defense 
(DoD) be a central line of effort� In his assessment 
of the QDR, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
General Martin Dempsey states, “With our ‘ends’ 
fixed and our ‘means’ declining, it is therefore 
imperative that we innovate within the ‘ways’ we 
defend the Nation� Successful innovation, particu-
larly for an organization as large and complex as 
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the U�S� military, is difficult�”2 DoD leaders are also concerned about the align-
ment of current military concepts and capabilities with a dynamic environment�
This article explores how successful organizations focus organizational energy 
and attention on refining their dominant theories of competition, often result-
ing in dysfunctional organizational responses, or systems of denial, to strategic 
anomalies—inconvenient information—that contradict assumptions� Our goal 
is twofold� First, we apply a novel theoretical approach in seeking to make lead-
ers more aware of a persistent strategic vulnerability—that is, how organizations 
ignore or dismiss strategic anomalies (events, ideas, or technologies that con-
tradict core strategic assumptions) through three systems of denial: “killing the 
messenger” by questioning the source of the anomaly; questioning the validity 
or relevance of the anomaly; and revising the competitive theory to make it more 
vague and less testable� Second, we describe six ways leaders can create condi-
tions that increase recognition of anomalies, by creating opportunities to see 
things that are contrary to strategic expectations, as well as to protect anomalies 
from the organization’s systems of denial� Organizations have a mixed record 
on both tasks, and dominant organizations, such as the U�S� military, are almost 
universally bad at the second� Developing appropriate and effective responses is a 
strategic leader responsibility and a fundamental requirement for leading change 
and innovation�
INNOVATION VERSUS SYSTEMS OF DENIAL
The U�S� military seeks a sustainable competitive advantage—it wants to win 
now and in the future� An organization sustains success when its strategy and 
resources align with the opportunities of the competitive environment� In a 
stable environment, dominant organizations (e�g�, the U�S� military) succeed by 
becoming better at executing their existing strategies, focusing on increasing 
efficiencies and improving core capabilities� When the environment changes, 
however, organizations succeed through innovation—developing and experi-
menting with novel strategies, and shifting resources to new approaches� These 
two organizational competencies have been called exploitation and exploration�3 
Yet this presents a paradox: organizations that are good at one tend not to be 
good at the other� 
Dominant organizations have systems that focus organizational energy and 
attention on exploitation—that is, sustaining the status quo and continuing to 
improve what they already do� This is a reasonable result of success� However, 
efficient exploitation often comes at the expense of continued learning and in-
novation� The ironic effect of systems of exploitation is that they generate dys-
functional organizational responses to inconvenient information, what we call 
systems of denial�
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Unlike a business, most of the time military organizations are not actually en-
gaged in competition; they must manufacture competitive conditions� The wars 
that the U�S� military imagines and the competition that it manufactures through 
its scenarios, war games, and simulations reflect its prevalent theories of the secu-
rity environment and the uses of military force� These theories tend to reflect the 
military’s successes in conflicts that may be of dubious relevance to the current 
and future security environments� For example, we believe the experiences of 
Iraq and Afghanistan have been insufficient (perhaps because they were painful) 
to challenge the military’s core assumptions about its required capabilities� After 
these distractions, the U�S� military has reengaged the exploitation behaviors� It 
knows what it does well and is determined to continue to do those things� This 
is good, as long as the things it does well now correspond to the things it actually 
needs to do� But competitive systems change� The danger for a successful orga-
nization is that, absent a significant competitive threat, it tends to fall back on 
comfortable assumptions and ignore, misrepresent, or manipulate information 
and innovations that contradict its most-cherished strategic beliefs� 
For the U�S� military, sustaining dominance will require significant explora-
tion of the emerging competitive environment� The crucial point is not whether 
the military has the correct competitive theories right now but what it does 
when confronted with innovations that suggest its theories may be incomplete 
or wrong� In peace, the military has the luxury to be wrong for a limited but un-
known time, and it is difficult to conclude whether any theory is right or wrong� 
What does the military do with that time? How does it seek new information? 
How does its strategy evolve in response to change and innovation? Continued 
dominance depends on the ability to subject theories of competition to contin-
ued, relentless scrutiny� Unfortunately, competitive dominance tends to frustrate 
this honest exploration� 
When something arises that is contrary to our theoretical expectations, it is an 
anomaly� Though anomalies appear to be failures, they are the essence of prog-
ress, because they provoke further inquiry, lead to new discoveries, and may yield 
new and better theories� Yet organizations often respond to anomalies not by 
subjecting them to honest examination but by ignoring them, suppressing them, 
or manipulating the learning process to protect familiar assumptions�
CHALLENGING THEORIES AND CHANGING MINDS
There is no more venerable military tradition than a healthy skepticism regarding 
new ideas� But such skepticism must be accompanied by openness to new infor-
mation that would lead us to change our minds and, in the case of strategic lead-
ers, to create conditions in which those discoveries can happen� Furthermore, 
when information suggests that assumptions supporting the status quo should 
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be examined, we must be equal opportunity skeptics—we cannot spare the old 
simply because it is comforting�
The assumptions that guide strategies have achieved that status because they 
have worked in the past, doing an excellent job of producing expected results, 
connecting hypotheses to corroborating findings� Theories are discarded when 
two conditions are met: first, the community of inquiry accumulates a sufficient 
number of observations contrary to core theoretical expectations (or anoma-
lies); and second, an alternative theory replaces the old system of explanation�4 
Anomalies arise at various points in the process popularly known as the scientific 
method: observing; theorizing; deducing testable hypotheses from theory; creat-
ing conditions to test those statements (experimentation); observing the results; 
and refining, revising, or rejecting the theory depending on the outcome�5 Once 
the facts no longer accord with expectations, a theory is discredited, and a theory 
that better accords with observation replaces it� 
What does theory mean in the military context? Theories of military competi-
tion are reflected most clearly in operational concepts and doctrine, usually built 
on what has worked in the past� These theories give us the means to organize 
and filter the limitless data of the environment� Without them, the world is just 
disconnected facts� Theories also provide a logical structure from which we 
can derive predictions, and those predictions guide strategic choice� The early 
twentieth-century theory of strategic bombing and the Mahanian concept of 
naval warfare are examples of powerful theories of military competition that al-
lowed military leaders to organize a myriad of information (about technology, 
force structure, and so on) and to derive predictions that drove strategic and 
operational decisions� 
Yet theories are not simply organizing frameworks� The predictions of a good 
theory should be testable or verifiable� Finally and crucially, all theories are 
provisional; a theory is never proven true, but it can at any time be refuted, and 
just one anomalous result may be sufficient to do it (though more anomalies are 
usually required)� Progress in any field depends on the acceptance of the idea 
that theories may be wrong—that the conditions that gave rise to a theory can 
and will change� 
Therefore, theories should be expected to die and be replaced on a regular 
basis, and (in the long term) this appears to be the case� Knowledge increases 
over time� But the short term (which in scientific history can mean decades or 
even centuries) seldom conforms to the rational ideal of the scientific method�6 
Although theories should be subject to the facts, they can survive long after 
the evidence has contradicted their fundamental assumptions� Why? Theories 
shape our understanding of the world� The evolutionary biologist Stephen Jay 
Gould wrote, “Facts do not ‘speak for themselves’; they are read in the light of 
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theory�”7 In other words, “facts” only become facts when we decide, and the tim-
ing and content of our decision depend on our theories� We want to learn the 
right lessons from the past and present, and we want to be prepared for future 
competition and conflict� Yet “right” is not a fixed concept� The process of learn-
ing and anticipation is highly subjective� We seek and interpret facts about the 
past and the present on the basis of theories of the way the world works� The 
past and present are not preselected sets of unambiguous facts with transparent 
causal connections to the present and future� They are more like a gigantic buffet 
of information, and the gathered facts on our little plates depend very much on 
tastes and appetites�
For a scientist who reaches the pinnacle of the geology community by describ-
ing a world in which the continents do not move, the notion that they do move 
(plate tectonics) is not simply a different theory; it is a repudiation of his life’s 
work and the work of his closest colleagues� Impassive acceptance of this kind 
of change is contrary to human nature� We are social and emotional creatures, 
preferring to make inconvenient facts (anomalies) subject to our theories� We do 
this as individuals, and we do this even more in organizations� 
These tendencies are particularly important when the theories of a profession-
al community involve competitive systems in which human beings make strategic 
choices� An organization is a social system with purpose, culture, structure, and 
resources built around a theory (or theories) of competition� In such complex 
and adaptive systems, there is no equivalent to the natural laws of the sciences, 
and therefore theories are much more likely to be wrong� Actors in a competi-
tive system adapt according to the actions of others, changing the behavior of 
the system as a whole�8 Because of these adaptations, all theories of competition 
must be provisional�
 
Successful organizations are marked by an almost single-minded adherence to 
a few core assumptions and are built on an organizational structure and culture 
that both shape and are shaped by a powerful theory of competition� In the con-
text of sustained success, organizations’ theories of competition can be extremely 
resistant to new and inconvenient facts� This is even more pronounced for a 
dominant military, which must imagine or synthetically produce competitive 
forces in peacetime�
Theories of competition are filters that exclude facts that do not fit the com-
petitive model� Such filtration of relevant and irrelevant phenomena is a core 
(and necessary) function of theory—no one can pay attention to everything at 
once� Biologists are unconcerned with gravitational singularities, and economists 
do not worry about the breeding habits of the mayfly� Problems arise when the 
theories exclude phenomena that should be core to strategic choice� Military and 
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business history demonstrates this troublesome legacy of success—that is, when 
theories that were once the basis for dominance become barriers to innovation 
and frustrate adaptation, decision makers become structurally blind to signifi-
cant changes in the environment� The fall of the Polaroid Corporation is a stark 
example of this� 
Through sixty years, Polaroid’s business was built on two powerful assump-
tions: consumers wanted a physical photographic print to preserve a moment, 
and they valued instant gratification�9 Polaroid was served well by these theories� 
In the world of instant photography, there was Polaroid and nothing else� And 
then Polaroid was gone, destroyed by the advent of digital photography� The digi-
tal photography revolution corroborated one of Polaroid’s strategic assumptions 
—the value of instant gratification—but it completely refuted the notion that 
consumers needed a physical print� Curiously, Polaroid pioneered some key 
digital imaging technology and was an early developer of a highly capable digital 
camera� Yet these innovations were ignored and misunderstood, as they did not 
conform to Polaroid’s theory of competition� Polaroid’s final investment in digital 
photography was a compact ink-jet printer to produce the physical print from 
the digital camera, demonstrating the firm’s continued adherence to the dubious 
assumption that consumers needed a physical print�
Similarly questionable assumptions have provoked crises for militaries� 
Consider the following, apparently unobjectionable statements: victory at sea 
depends on the destruction of an enemy’s fleet; freed from a tyrant, a liberated 
people will welcome and cooperate with its liberators�
The first concept was the guiding assumption for Royal Navy strategy at the 
start of both world wars� In both conflicts, the German navy circumvented the 
Royal Navy, avoiding direct engagement and focusing its efforts on building U-
boat force structure and antimerchant operations�10 The Royal Navy’s slowness in 
recognizing the German submarine threat to merchant shipping, and its delay in 
adopting convoy tactics, nearly brought the British war effort to ruin twice within 
a twenty-five-year span�11 These crises were rooted in the Royal Navy’s view of 
the protection of commerce as a mission unworthy of its attention and resources�
The second statement describes the core assumptions of American military 
operations during preparation for the Iraq war and throughout the first three 
years of the conflict� During the crescendo of violence against coalition forces 
in Iraq from 2003 to 2006, U�S� military and civilian leaders insisted that attacks 
were carried out by foreign fighters or that there was no Iraqi insurgency�12 Amer-
ican policy makers and military leaders could not effectively respond to rising 
violence in Iraq until they recognized its sources� Why did they take so long to 
do so? In the absence of discovering weapons of mass destruction, the most im-
portant justification for the war was the liberation narrative, which included the 
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assumption that a liberated people does not kill the liberators� Acknowledgment 
of the insurgency contradicted the dominant theory of the political situation in 
the country and, as a result, delayed changes in American strategy for three years�
In both military cases, the organizations persisted in their erroneous assump-
tions as they followed a path of systematic denial, despite evidence that their 
assumptions were wrong� This persistence is destructive, yet avoidable� It is one 
thing to suffer catastrophe because of the unforeseeable�13 It is another to suffer 
it because we—repeatedly, over an extended period—refuse to see what is right 
in front of us�
In highlighting how an excessive commitment to the dominant current theory 
perverts organizational learning, we do not argue for reflexive abandonment of 
key strategic assumptions� Chaos results from the instantaneous abandonment 
of core assumptions in response to contradictory information� The key is to do it 
right� We now turn to what “wrong” looks like�
THE SYSTEMS OF DENIAL AT WORK
The U�S� military does not have a monopoly on the stubborn adherence to an 
erroneous theory� The history of science is rich with examples, and the methods 
by which scientific communities resist theoretical innovation are instructive� 
Philosophers of science, such as Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn, and Imre Lakatos, 
have examined the social dynamics of scientific communities and theoretical 
progress�14 Kuhn’s work on scientific revolutions and paradigm shifts has been 
imported to the social sciences� However, Popper’s and Lakatos’s influential 
frameworks for examining how theories are refuted have been largely ignored�15 
Adapting to the military context what Popper called conventionalist strategies 
for defending existing theories against contrary evidence helps us identify three 
dysfunctional responses, or systems of denial, that occur when organizations 
are confronted with information that challenges their core competitive assump-
tions�16 That is, organizations tend to do the following:
• Question the intentions, authority, or legitimacy of the source (colloquially, 
“killing the messenger”)�
• Question the validity, generalizability, or applicability of the information 
(“that doesn’t apply to us”)�
• Revise the theory to make it less testable (and more resistant to refutation)� 
These responses are not in themselves bad� Indeed, each is a fundamental part 
of legitimate inquiry� But they can be misapplied, as often happens in the defense 
of established theories and concepts against an onslaught of information that 
undermines them� Such dysfunctional responses to anomalies are predictable, 
destructive, and preventable� 
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Killing the Messenger: Questioning the Source of the Anomaly 
All inconvenient facts come from some source� If the source of an anomaly is not 
believable, then we are freed from the burden of dealing with the anomaly itself� 
Successfully undermining the source of an anomaly requires that we not only 
convince ourselves of the unreliability of the source but also persuade other key 
stakeholders of that fact�
Lieutenant Colonel Douglas Macgregor’s 1997 book, Breaking the Phalanx, 
criticized U�S� Army structure, culture, and strategy, and recommended sig-
nificant change�17 Macgregor was subsequently dismissed as a complainer with a 
myopic worldview (at best), or treated as a heretic (at worst)�18 “Killing the mes-
senger” can be accomplished in three ways: attack his legitimacy by questioning 
his credentials; attack his credibility by asserting that the source has bad inten-
tions; or make ad hominem attacks� 
When attacking a source’s legitimacy, we question his qualifications in mak-
ing statements or presenting data, based on professional credentials, experience, 
seniority, etc� This approach is preferable to assaults on credibility or ad homi-
nem attacks, because it seeks to discredit someone on the basis of impersonal 
considerations� Convincing people that the messenger does not have the required 
expertise or knowledge fully to understand the phenomenon ends the conversa-
tion� Failing that, we can usually argue that the messenger is not privy to the 
critical information that enables us to understand the situation more fully� In 
the military, a hallmark of this tactic is invoking classification restrictions—for 
example, “If he knew what we knew, he would agree with us�”
A second approach to undermining a source is to question his credibility, cast-
ing doubt on trustworthiness or intentions� We may assert malice of intent, self-
interest, mixed loyalties, or conflicts of interest� Contending that a source wants 
to undermine the organization or that a source benefits from actions taken as a 
result of a change makes it easier to dismiss the source’s criticisms� Questioning 
credibility suggests corruption in the source’s specific motivations—for example, 
“John Doe is criticizing the Army because John Doe hates the Army�”
A third means of discounting a source is a simple ad hominem attack� As 
defined here, ad hominem attacks suggest corruption in the source as a whole� 
Whereas in a credibility attack, we question motive, in an ad hominem attack, 
we seek to undermine the source completely—such as “John Doe is criticizing 
the Army because John Doe is an idiot�” Ad hominem attacks generally take one 
of two forms: abusive or circumstantial�19 Abusive attacks, such as “John Doe is 
an idiot,” involve unambiguous statements that question a source’s mental com-
petence, character, honesty, etc�; in circumstantial attacks we indirectly suggest 
corruption in a source� Because preserving and propagating ambiguity are one 
of the core principles of resisting anomalies (clear statements can be refuted), 
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circumstantial attacks are more devious (and effective) than directly abusive at-
tacks� Guilt by association, in which we note that a source is part of a community 
or organization widely regarded in a negative light, is a classic circumstantial 
attack� For example, saying, “He gets most of his ideas on the role of the military 
from his State Department friends,” may convince many in the military that the 
messenger is not to be trusted� 
While questioning the source is the easiest way to dismiss an anomaly, it also 
incurs risks� When a large, powerful organization is perceived to attack a less 
powerful outsider or a maverick within the organization, the sympathies of key 
stakeholders may be swayed by the natural tendency to root for the underdog� 
For this reason, when effective proxies are available to question a source’s legiti-
macy or credibility, or to attack the source’s character, they tend to be used� Those 
who allow others to do their dirty work for them are more likely to appear to be 
impartial observers�
“But They’re Not Us”: Questioning the Data
Having failed to reject the anomaly on the basis of the messenger, we may ques-
tion the validity of the data� Three classic strategies for challenging data, in order 
of difficulty, are, first, question the results on procedural grounds (“they did 
it wrong”); second, question the generalizability of the data (“it doesn’t apply 
to us”); and third, dismiss the results on the basis of contradictory replication 
studies (“we tried it ourselves, and it didn’t work”)� All three of these arguments 
may be legitimate challenges to inconvenient information, but they may also be 
abused�
Procedural challenges to data involve questioning the way in which the data 
were gathered—focusing on the conduct of the experiment, simulation, war 
game, etc� They free organizations from the necessity of analyzing the results of 
an experiment or the character of the phenomenon� If the outcome is the result 
of nonstandard inputs, then we have an easy escape: “They did it wrong, so the 
results don’t matter�” The complexity of the inputs in competitive environments 
provides myriad opportunities to dismiss data on procedural grounds� Look hard 
enough, and a leader can always find something objectionable in the way that a 
result was produced� The list of excuses is long� 
Even in wartime, when current operations should provide unambiguous 
evidence of failure, militaries have a great capacity for denial� In the first years 
of World War II, the U�S� Navy Bureau of Ordnance refused to acknowledge 
that its Mark 14 torpedo was fundamentally flawed, despite submarine crews’ 
repeated reports of failures� The torpedoes ran too deep and were equipped 
with a flawed magnetic exploder, and “the contact exploder was so fragile that a 
direct hit was sufficient to destroy it without causing the torpedo to explode�”20 
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In the meantime, the bureau blamed the crews, concluding they must be using it 
improperly—a procedural objection to the data� When the bureau finally sent an 
officer to observe whether the error indeed lay with the crews, he was unable to 
find a single fault with the crews’ actions; yet his report still placed all the blame 
for the torpedo problems on the personnel�21 Not until the summer of 1943 would 
a new design resolve the torpedo problem� If this is what military organizations 
can do in a time of war, when lives are being lost, what are organizations capable 
of explaining away in less dire competitive contexts?
Failing to dismiss the data on procedural grounds, we can question the gen-
eralizability of the data themselves; that is, we must demonstrate that the data do 
not apply to us, usually by arguing against an analogy� The potential arguments 
against an analogy are too numerous to catalog here; we highlight two broad 
objections�
First, we may argue that the competitive context—the time, the place, the 
product market, the economic conditions, etc�—is too different for a valid com-
parison� For example, American car manufacturers could have glimpsed their 
own future in the near bankruptcy of Harley-Davidson motorcycles in the early 
1980s� From 1972 to 1982, Harley-Davidson’s U�S� market share in motorcycles 
with an engine displacement exceeding a thousand cubic centimeters dropped 
from 100 percent to 14 percent, as Japanese imports offered better performance, 
fuel efficiency, and reliability—all at lower cost� But motorcycles are not cars, and 
Harley-Davidson’s brush with corporate death was little noted by auto manufac-
turers, except in its demonstration of the appeal of protective tariffs�22 
Second, we may argue that a difference in one of the key actors makes a 
comparison invalid� In this case, we acknowledge that the competitive context 
is comparable, but one of the competitors is not� For example, when a Southeast 
Asian guerrilla force defeats a European ally armed with American weapons and 
fielding an army with veterans of the 1944–45 European campaign in key posi-
tions, we dismiss it because the French are a colonial power in decline, lacking the 
righteous purpose and military strength of the United States�23 The French expe-
rience in Vietnam is therefore judged as irrelevant to American strategy� Arguing 
against the generalizability of an anomaly is easy; the complexity of competitive 
environments provides numerous candidates� 
The final means of questioning data is through a replication study that is engi-
neered to fail—that is, to try to reproduce an anomaly in an environment that we 
control, to demonstrate that the anomaly is not real� Although the spirit of a rep-
lication study is (not surprisingly) to seek to replicate the result of someone else’s 
study or experiment to corroborate a finding, an organization often uses one to 
get the result that it wants� In the early twentieth century, a young American naval 
officer named William Sims sent the Bureau of Ordnance reports documenting 
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astonishing feats of naval gunnery that were based on modifications to equip-
ment and training that he adopted from the Royal Navy� The U�S� Navy initially 
ignored his reports, but Sims persisted� Finally, he was told that his reported 
results were simply impossible� The Navy, it turned out, had conducted a replica-
tion study using Sims’s suggested modifications and had concluded that Sims’s 
results were impossible, because the gun crew could not elevate and depress the 
gun fast enough� 
The failed replication study reveals the power of organizations to deceive 
themselves� The Bureau of Ordnance had conducted the trials on land, mean-
ing that gunnery crews were attempting to elevate and depress the gun without 
the assistance of the compensating roll of the ship; that is, the experiments did 
not replicate conditions at sea, where the gun is elevated on the down roll and 
depressed on the up roll� (As one side of a ship moves downward or upward, its 
motion reduces the force required to elevate or depress the gun at a given rate�) 
Intentionally or not, the bureau ensured that it would arrive at the answer it 
wanted�24
The Shape-Shifting Theory: Resisting Refutation through Constant Theoretical 
Change
It is possible that none of the aforementioned systems of denial will work� The 
source may be reliable (or assaults against him may fail)� The data may be im-
possible to ignore� Does this necessitate abandonment of core assumptions? No� 
In the event that we start to lose the game, we can always change the rules� The 
last refuge of a weak theory is the revision of the theory, usually to make it less 
testable� 
Theoretical revision is not necessarily a bad thing—revising a theory in the 
face of disconfirming information may be exactly the right thing to do� A single 
meaningful result that is contrary to expectation may be sufficient to refute a 
theory, but mature theories are seldom abandoned on the basis of just one anom-
aly� Instead, when an anomaly is accepted as a legitimate challenge to the theory, 
we prefer to revise the theory first—replacing it with another theory as a last 
resort� A successful theory makes predictive statements (if x, then y; or [x → y])� 
Theory revisions modify these statements (while preserving the core theory) 
in one of three ways: redefine the outcome, redefine the phenomenon, or add 
auxiliary hypotheses� 
The distinction between the right and wrong ways to revise a theory is simple: 
proper revisions to theory yield hypotheses that are more testable than they were 
prior to the revision; improper revisions yield hypotheses that are less testable�25 
Indeed, “last refuge” revisions often result in changes that make testing the theory 
extremely difficult, if not impossible� 
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Redefining outcomes and redefining the phenomenon are ways to reframe 
the success or failure of a theory and produce moderate reductions in test-
ability� These tactics capitalize on the complexity and ambiguity of the strategic 
environment—the more complex a phenomenon, the greater the potential for 
disagreement regarding basic concepts such as success and failure, or the essen-
tial characteristics of the phenomenon itself� 
When we redefine the outcome, we change our definition or interpretation 
of success and failure (changing our definition of y in [x → y])� If a theory does 
not produce its predicted result, or if some other theory challenges it, we simply 
change the desired outcome to make the dominant theory appear once again suc-
cessful, or to make the challenging theory appear unsuccessful� For example, dur-
ing World War I, the British defeated the German submarine threat by adopting 
convoy tactics� After the war, the Royal Navy was eager to forget this experience 
and focus on the kind of naval warfare it liked, epitomized by the battle of Jut-
land�26 When naval planners reflected on the effectiveness of convoy operations, 
they emphasized that the convoy escorts had sunk just twenty out of 178 total 
German submarines destroyed during the war� This amounts to changing the 
rules of the game� As Holger Herwig observes, “They refused to recognize that 
what counted was not the number of submarine ‘kills,’ but rather the number of 
merchantmen safely in port�”27 Under the new performance measure, convoys 
appeared ineffective and were therefore easier to forget� Redefinition of outcomes 
may delay refutation by forcing a theory’s opponents to justify prior definitions of 
success or failure, or to seek to refute the theory under the new definitions (and 
therefore execute another round of observation and experimentation)� 
The testability of a theory is also reduced if the new outcomes resist clear mea-
surement or observation� Sometimes an outcome is only partially observable or 
cannot be observed at all, or it cannot be observed under the desired conditions� 
This is almost always true of strategic outcomes� Even with a consensus regard-
ing the definition of success or failure, there may be disagreement about what 
actually happened� What was the outcome of the Iraq war? Who lost? Who won? 
These are simple questions without simple answers� Many theories of that con-
flict can find some justification in historical evidence� The potential for redefini-
tion of what “winning” means and for reinterpretation of the actual outcomes is 
almost limitless�
Redefining the phenomenon (changing our definition of x in [x → y]) offers 
another potent means of resistance to refutation� We do not just change the defi-
nitions or interpretations of success and failure; we change the entire framework 
for measurement� If a review of the utility of the aircraft carrier reveals that its 
core role as the instrument of attack for the Navy has been rendered obsolete 
by the combination of low-end adversaries that offer few worthwhile targets for 
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aerial strikes and high-end adversaries who make carriers too difficult to protect 
within their effective strike range, we may defend the carrier by broadening our 
definition of what it is: not only an attack platform but also a symbol of American 
power� Thus, the carrier’s symbolic value becomes a key measure of performance� 
Testing this proposition requires that we measure how effective the carrier is as 
a symbol, but the concept is so fuzzy that it defies measurement� This makes it 
particularly appealing as a theoretical defense for the carrier concept�
A third approach to theory revision is the modification of the theory itself� We 
say that x is going to result in y, but when we do x, something unexpected (dif-
ferent from y) happens� In such circumstances, the concept may yet be preserved 
by adding auxiliary—literally, “helping”—hypotheses to explain y� An auxiliary 
hypothesis adds conditions to our predictions when our predictions turn out to 
be incorrect—that is, changing the prediction from (x → y) to (w & x → y)� It is 
not inherently wrong to do this� Indeed, auxiliary hypotheses are a central aspect 
of the refinement of existing theories� 
One of the best examples of proper theory revision comes from nineteenth-
century astronomy, when scientists noticed that the planet Uranus’s orbit failed 
to follow the path predicted by Newtonian physics� Instead of abandoning New-
ton’s laws and searching for a better alternative, astronomers postulated that an 
undiscovered, more distant planet was affecting the orbit of Uranus� Using the 
actual path of Uranus’s orbit, two mathematicians told astronomers where to 
look, calculating both the probable mass and position of the unknown planet� 
Neptune was soon discovered very close to the predicted position� Newton’s 
theory was corroborated, but our model for the structure of the solar system had 
to be revised�
The story of Neptune’s discovery illustrates the key characteristic of a good 
auxiliary hypothesis: it imposes a higher experimental or observational test� Pos-
tulating not only the existence of an undiscovered planet but also its mass and 
position was a precise and highly improbable prediction (i�e�, the random chance 
of finding a planet in that part of space was extremely—almost infinitesimally 
—low)� That the planet was found was a great achievement of the theory of New-
tonian physics� Note that we may lack the technical capability to perform the test; 
for example, it took centuries for astronomers to verify the distances of the stars 
that were postulated by the adoption of the Copernican system� The key is that an 
effective auxiliary hypothesis postulates something that drives further inquiry� In 
resisting innovation, however, organizations often employ auxiliary hypotheses 
in a way that hinders learning�
The main indicator of a bad auxiliary hypothesis is that it cannot be unam-
biguously measured or verified, and therefore cannot be refuted� In the years 
leading up to World War I, the theory of warfare favored by the British and the 
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French was what historian Tim Travers calls “the cult of the offensive�”28 However, 
when the British army suffered terrible losses in assaults in the early battles of the 
Boer War, European observers were disturbed� Why would a continental army 
trained and hardened by years of colonial warfare and equipped with the latest 
weaponry struggle so much against an irregular force? The advent of modern 
firepower (mobile, rapid-firing artillery; accurate, rapid-loading rifles; and ma-
chine guns) meant that an advancing force could no longer protect itself with its 
own fires� At least it appeared that way� To preserve the theory of the offensive, 
strategists needed to come up with an alternative explanation for why the Brit-
ish failed� A widely articulated auxiliary hypothesis was that the British army 
lacked the proper spirit to carry out effective offensive operations on the modern 
battlefield� This explanation arises from procedural objections to the anomaly; 
in essence, the British did not do it right (“it” being the offensive)�29 The beauty 
of this auxiliary hypothesis is that it has the quality most essential to defensive 
revisions of a weak theory: it cannot be refuted� 
Auxiliary hypotheses can be very effective in providing a theory with an im-
penetrable barrier to refutation� If we propose, “An attacking force with a ratio 
of at least five to one within the area of assault will be successful in the assault, 
regardless of the defensive fortifications and firepower,” we have the potential 
to be refuted� The ratio is verifiable� A single example of a sufficiently superior 
force failing in the assault will contradict the hypothesis� However, if we revise the 
prediction as follows, “An attacking force with high morale and a ratio of at least 
five to one within the area of assault will be successful in the assault, regardless 
of the defensive fortifications and firepower,” we have compromised the theory� 
The addition of three small words has made our statement impervious to refuta-
tion� Any time an assault fails, we can dismiss it as a failure not of the concept (or 
training, equipment, etc�), but of morale, a conveniently unmeasurable quality� 
Irrefutable statements are the hallmark of a bad theory� As the scientist Richard 
Fortey observes, “The theories that can cause much more trouble are those that 
can twist and turn in a breeze of new facts without ever fracturing completely�”30
We have described three organizational tendencies that form a powerful system 
of denial in response to inconvenient information� How can the military avoid 
making common mistakes in responding to data that contradict its theories of 
what does and does not work? What can a leader do to discourage these behav-
iors and encourage the right responses? While there is no simple solution, in the 
following section we describe six practices that will improve a leader’s chances to 
“beat the system” of denial, to identify anomalies and follow up with a balanced 
and thoughtful exploration of what they mean� 
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SIX WAYS TO BEAT THE SYSTEM (OF DENIAL)
Building organizational skill in recognizing and analyzing novel phenomena is 
the means by which we seize control of strategic innovation� If we fail to alter our 
theories in the absence of dangerous competition—when we have the time and 
luxury to do so—we will be compelled to do it through painful experience, under 
less appealing conditions� Effective military leaders must create an environment 
in which organizations identify anomalies in the external environment; seek 
anomalies through their own exploratory activities; and revise their strategic as-
sumptions (theories of competition) to make them more testable or replace them 
with alternatives� For these three tasks we recommend six practices and explain 
them in approximate order of the required commitment in time and resources 
(low at the beginning, high at the end)�
Identify Anomalies in the External Environment
Military organizations must develop sensitivity to anomalies as they arise in the 
external environment� Yet organizations function by channeling and filtering 
information, and by directing leaders’ attention� These processes are necessary 
to the normal functioning of organizations; without channels, filters, and direc-
tion, we would be overwhelmed by unstructured data� But leaders must develop 
mechanisms for recognizing important changes that arise outside these channels� 
Conduct Formal Thought Experiments with the Help of a Team. On a regular 
basis, leaders must specify what new information or changes in environmental 
conditions would cause them to question or abandon their core assumptions� In 
essence, leaders need to imagine when they would change their minds� This is 
perhaps the most fundamental of all skills required in leading innovation�
We like to believe that when the facts change, we change our minds� But the 
recognition of such changes depends on whether we are looking for them, and we 
find them more readily when we seek them in response to a question that we have 
already asked� We recommend that at regular intervals, leaders work with a team 
built specifically for this purpose�31 The product of the team’s work is a formal 
description of core strategic assumptions (at least three, no more than five) and 
events or facts that would invalidate those assumptions� What signals would sug-
gest that assumptions are at risk? At these meetings, leaders and other team mem-
bers make “reputational bets” about the environment and their strategic assump-
tions�32 For example, the force structure of the Air Force reflects the technological 
limitations of munitions� Fighter jets exist not for their own sake but because 
small, numerous platforms are required to get close enough to strike enemy air 
and ground forces� Efficient directed-energy weapons would potentially upend 
this framework, favoring the development of large, “mother ship” platforms that 
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would destroy targets from great distances using energy traveling at the speed of 
light� At some point, Air Force modernization and force structure would need 
to change radically to realize the potential of these weapons� What events in the 
environment would signal a need to begin such change? A thought experiment is 
a commitment to reexamine core assumptions when the facts change�
A structured thought experiment serves four important purposes� First, it 
helps us to identify core assumptions; the principles that lie at the heart of our 
theories are often so familiar to us that they are invisible� We treat them as laws of 
nature, never to be questioned, not as assumptions that are inherently provision-
al� Second, it forces us to make formal commitments to reviewing our theories� 
Refutation is a matter of degree, not absolutes, and we can always reconcile facts 
to our chosen theories� Nevertheless, if we say that we shall change our minds 
if x happens, and x actually happens, then we must either change our minds, 
or explain how we have adjusted our assumptions to accommodate x. Third, in 
identifying conditions that would prompt us to change our minds, we become 
more likely to recognize those conditions if they arise� This is a crucial point: 
the simple act of naming something makes us more likely to see it� Finally, the 
thought experiment highlights the parts of our system of assumptions that are not 
subject to facts� We do not wish to denigrate the role of faith (or its close cousin, 
intuition) in strategy development� However, wherever faith becomes the main 
support of an assumption, a leader should create mechanisms in the organization 
through which those who do not share that faith have the freedom, the power, 
and the resources to challenge the status quo�
Don’t Succumb to the Tyranny of Expertise; Institutionalize Brokerage. Leaders 
must have the wisdom to separate the messenger, however abrasive, from the 
message� Challenges to orthodoxy are more likely to come from sources that 
stand outside the dominant strategic system for the very reason that they are 
outside the system� They are not captured by our theories and are more likely to 
see emergent inconsistencies between our core assumptions and strategic reality� 
First, we must overcome the tyranny of expertise� We may believe that only 
the experts are qualified to comment on a theory’s soundness� However, those 
who have the strongest credentials under an existing theory also tend to be cre-
dentialed by a system that has arisen around that theory� That is, their status as 
experts is not independent of the theory; it is a product of the theory’s success to 
date� Those we trust the most as experts are often the least likely to recognize and 
identify anomalies� For instance, Air Force pilots were not the early proponents 
of unmanned aerial systems�33
Second, the perspective and openness required to identify potential anoma-
lies, the willpower to create a context for revealing them, and the moral courage 
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to point them out may be correlated with personality characteristics that make 
such sources more susceptible to messenger-killing tactics� Those with the con-
fidence and imagination to propose anomalies frequently lack the social intelli-
gence and savoir faire required to persuade audiences of the importance of their 
insights� Iconoclasts like American military-aviation pioneer Billy Mitchell and 
British strategist Basil Liddell Hart often fail to differentiate between potential 
allies and enemies within the organization, alienating those who would support 
their positions� Anomalies are likely to come from sources that are vulnerable to 
questions of credibility and legitimacy� Leaders must serve as advocates for such 
challenging perspectives�
Leaders can foster the development of officers who are sensitive to external 
viewpoints by institutionalizing brokerage� In social networks, a broker is a node 
in the network that connects groups that are not otherwise connected� The social 
theorist Ronald Burt has argued that brokers are more likely to have good ideas 
because they see actual and potential combinations that others cannot�34 The 
highly cohesive and almost cloistered networks of military personnel do not lend 
themselves to creating mental and organizational environments that challenge 
conventional wisdom� 
Institutionalizing brokerage means creating opportunities for members of the 
organization to work with other entities, particularly those with different theories 
of competition� This requires that military organizations reward officers with 
high-quality “broadening” experiences, including not only joint and interagency 
work but also exchanges with foreign militaries and meaningful service in think 
tanks, universities, laboratories, and even private firms� Brokerage is about build-
ing ties to communities that are more likely to see the environment differently� In 
this way, the organization is more likely to perceive changes that would usually 
be filtered out or ignored, and to be exposed to different theories of competition� 
Deliberately Seek and Explore Anomalies
Leaders should use internal organizational resources to seek out and explore 
anomalies, to anticipate and drive change� The two recommendations above seek 
to increase the probability that organizations will recognize anomalies in the 
external environment� Yet leaders are not only at the mercy of events—they can 
shape events, as well�
Experiments are one of the most powerful tools available to organizations, yet 
strategic leaders seldom take advantage of them, because they lack understand-
ing of experimental design and how to operationalize experimental principles in 
nonscientific contexts�35 A good experiment must have at least three character-
istics: it must vary from normal organizational practices in some fundamental 
way, and the variance must be isolated to allow for measurement or comparison; 
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it must have the potential to produce a surprising result; and it must be relevant 
to the theory—it must have the potential to call into question the existing theory, 
or to suggest that a new theory offers a better explanation of the phenomenon�36 
We recommend the following two practices to leverage the learning opportuni-
ties in experimentation�
Create Space for Planned and Unplanned Variance. The more variance we toler-
ate, the more likely we are to learn� This fact must be weighed against the risks 
that accompany experimentation� Where we introduce different treatments and 
how much variance we tolerate are questions requiring serious consideration� We 
cannot perform experiments that jeopardize lives or undermine public trust, for 
example� But without variance, there is no experiment�
Leaders are responsible for creating and fostering both formal (planned) and 
informal (unplanned) variance� Pilot programs, war games, simulations, and 
experimental units are examples of mechanisms for planned variance� Strategy 
development is well suited to simultaneous implementation and evaluation of 
several different experimental interventions—rapid prototyping� Not everything 
will be fruitful, but what works and what does not work are both learning op-
portunities� Persistent and widespread experimentation increases the probability 
that you will find a subset that improves your understanding� Clearly, the wars in 
Iraq and Afghanistan created opportunities (and necessities) for constant experi-
mentation� The question left unanswered is, to what extent did the results of these 
experiments change the deeply held assumptions of any of the military services?
A second means to introduce variance is through informal experimentation� 
The potential for learning from user innovation is tremendous, though it pre sents 
its own set of difficulties� Linus’s law of software debugging, as interpreted by Eric 
Raymond, posits, “Given enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow�” By “shallow,” 
Raymond means that a problem is susceptible to solution� More people dealing 
creatively with problems of discovery “increases the probability that someone’s 
toolkit will be matched to the problem in such a way that the bug is shallow to 
that person�”37 User innovation leverages a similar community of exploration and 
experimentation, and it requires that leaders tolerate unplanned variance�
Create Conditions in Which Surprising Experimental Results Are Not Just 
Possible—but Desired. When organizations are biased in favor of confirming 
their strategic assumptions, experimentation is concerned with validating ex-
isting concepts, which may be done through highly engineered exercises that 
only fail to produce the expected result when somebody makes an error� This 
is a gross misuse of the term experiment. For example, the 2002 U�S� military 
MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE war games and joint exercises illustrated some effective 
aspects of experimental design and procedure� The opposing force in MILLENNIUM 
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CHALLENGE introduced battlefield conditions that varied considerably from nor-
mal practice, and the results of this variance were surprising� In these two re-
spects, the experiment was well conceived and executed� Instead of interpreting 
this information as a signal that the organization should scrutinize its conceptual 
assumptions, it responded to the surprise by resetting the game, eliminating the 
problematic variance, and producing the validating result that it desired�38 This 
was a squandered opportunity� Avoiding this error requires a shift of mind in how 
we assess success and failure in experimentation� We need to recognize that some 
failure is noble, and some success is empty� 
The challenge for innovative leaders is engineering the competitive context in 
a way that reveals problems with the organization’s dominant theories� In war, the 
enemy provides that context� In peace, the military must manufacture it artifi-
cially through war games, simulations, exercises, etc�39 Effective experimentation 
requires reframing “winning” in strategy development�40 When the goal of explo-
ration and experimentation is innovation, objectives should emphasize outcomes 
that test established strategic concepts and challenge existing assumptions� In this 
context, failure in an experiment, whether a war game or a product pilot, should 
be valued for the opportunity that it provides to revise and refine the concept 
under examination or to suggest a viable alternative� A leader must persuade the 
organization that a surprising outcome in a war game or simulation is not just 
acceptable but desirable� Such surprises are the means by which we identify new 
problems, create an impetus for change, and develop a structure for innovation� 
By reframing the objectives of experimentation, organizations will be more likely 
to discover those new problems�
Experiments should create variance in areas that pertain to meaningful stra-
tegic assumptions� In the event that a result contradicts expectations, the experi-
ment should provoke theoretical revision and further experimentation� Leader-
ship owns the strategic assumptions in a military service, and leaders should be 
intensely interested in challenging those assumptions�
Revise the Theory the Right Way, or Replace It with Something Better 
In our first recommendation, we proposed a thought experiment for identifying 
the conditions that would prompt us to change or modify our assumptions� But 
what happens when those conditions arise? Our final two recommendations 
concern how leaders can foster the development of new theories and turn those 
theories into operational reality�
Make the Old Theory Work for a Living. The way in which we articulate ideas 
influences our subsequent search for the truth� Recognizing an anomaly and 
supporting innovation do not require that we abandon established ways of do-
ing things; we always have the option of modifying our current theories with an 
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appropriate auxiliary hypothesis� The key is to use auxiliary hypotheses not to 
shore up established theories by making irrefutable statements but to refine theo-
ries by increasing their testability, or to develop alternative theories� For example, 
“All weapons-release decisions require a human input” is a universal statement of 
a principle governing the use of drones� It expresses a theory about the limits of 
full autonomy, and it creates a condition in which the theory will be challenged� 
If we identify a case in which we would accept a fully autonomous kill decision, 
we have invalidated the principle of universally limited autonomy� At this point, 
we have two valid options for reformulating our theory�
First, we can add a testable auxiliary hypothesis to the old theory: “All weapons- 
release decisions require human input when conditions a, b, and c hold�” This cre-
ates conditions in which the revised theory is still falsifiable, as will occur when 
we show that a drone can be fully autonomous under conditions a, b, and c� This 
is crucial to learning�
The second option is that we scrap our old theory and begin to develop a new 
theory to explain full autonomy� Innovation becomes a matter of building a new 
and vaguely defined theory of automation, not a defensive withdrawal to protect 
the old theory of human control� The move from a theory of human control of 
kill decisions that has auxiliary hypotheses to a preliminary theory of full au-
tomation may take a long time, or it may be swift� Much depends on whether 
change begins during peace or war�
If we modify a theory in response to anomalies, the modification should 
always be in the direction of greater testability—that is, the statements that we 
derive from our modified theory should be more refutable� As noted earlier, or-
ganizations tend to do the opposite, making theories impervious to refutation by 
layering on untestable statements� Leaders set the tone for organizational inquiry� 
When it comes to challenging our assumptions, the Fabian approach (a military 
strategy that avoids decisive conflict) to theory defense should not be tolerated� 
We must be relentless in subjecting our old assumptions to new tests�
Build Organizational Units That Succeed with a New Theory. At the individual 
level, it is almost impossible to review evidence without bias; our theories are 
powerful lenses that distort our reading of the facts� Yet leaders can guide explo-
ration at the organizational level to ensure that someone seeks in good faith to 
verify, reproduce, and expand on the findings of anomalies� Essentially, the leader 
needs to engineer competition such that at least one alternative theory competes 
with the established view, and that the two (or more) theories have a level playing 
field� Adjudicating a theoretical competition is hard, but not having any competi-
tion at all is worse� 
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The creation of organizations that are free to construct a new culture based 
on new ideas about what works is a powerful leadership tool� In his theory of 
disruptive innovation, Clayton Christensen describes how established firms can 
overcome resistance to innovations by creating semiautonomous units that suc-
ceed by finding a viable business for a new product� 
Established firms are often driven out of business later by new, smaller firms 
that develop what appear to be inferior or irrelevant technologies in new markets� 
The smaller firms move into the dominant firms’ core market when the innova-
tion improves enough to meet customer requirements in the core business� To 
avoid this fate, Christensen recommends that established firms spin off an inde-
pendent organization that lives or dies by the new (and for the time being, infe-
rior) technology� He writes, “Creating an organizational context in which this ef-
fort can prosper will be crucial, because rational resource allocation processes in 
established companies consistently deny disruptive [innovations] the resources 
they need to survive, regardless of the commitment senior management may 
ostensibly have made to the program�”41 
Successful organizations usually excel at innovating in areas that are relevant 
to core strategic concepts� However, when an innovation does not conform to 
the organization’s dominant concept, leaders can create organizational structures 
that support the new approach� This involves creating and resourcing organiza-
tions that survive by doing things that meet current market needs and, in the 
process, identify new markets for their products� Such organizations must do 
more than just produce good ideas� They must find a market (in military terms, 
a valid/current mission) for the innovation, an application that demonstrates—
even on a small scale—the effectiveness of the innovation sufficient to guarantee 
a flow of financial resources� Absent this demonstration, the innovation will be 
deprived of resources, resulting in underinvestment (if not abandonment)� It 
is not enough to create new organizational structures around innovative ideas� 
Markets are what organizations resource, and the leader must create a structural 
context in which potentially disruptive innovations are linked to current mission 
requirements�
We need not highlight how difficult it is to execute these ideas� There are no 
simple answers to the key questions� Who will be assigned to the new organiza-
tion? What implications will that assignment have for their careers? Who will 
fight for resources in the budget for the new entity, especially after its creator or 
advocate retires or is reassigned? These are challenging problems, but a support-
ive organizational design is a powerful tool for developing strategic alternatives, 
as Admiral William Moffett demonstrated in setting conditions for the develop-
ment of the naval aviation community in the 1920s�42
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None of This Works without Educated Officers
Underlying all of these recommendations is an inescapable reality: we need intel-
ligent, open-minded leaders—men and women who understand the fundamental 
principles of logic and evidence, are nimble enough to recognize the significance 
of strategic anomalies, and have the mental tools to think of what to do next� 
At each level of officer development, we must demand that officers learn and 
relearn core principles of epistemology: logic, scientific reasoning, and research 
methods� Instruction on logic should include deductive (rational) and inductive 
(empirical) reasoning, as well as inference to the best explanation� Instruction 
on scientific reasoning should review the basics of the philosophy of science� 
What is a theory? What are the characteristics of a good theory? How do we 
choose among competing theories? What is the scientific method and how 
much does it correspond to science as practiced? What constitutes scientific 
proof or contradiction? What are the prominent historical models of scientific 
discovery? Instruction on research methods should include both inferential and 
Bayesian statistical approaches, probability, measurement, experimental design, 
and natural experiments� We do not argue that this material must be covered in 
great depth� But at present the overwhelming majority of senior officers have no 
background in these concepts�
Sustaining dominance requires significant exploration of the emerging com-
petitive environment� The crucial point is not whether the U�S� military has the 
correct competitive theories right now but what it does when confronted with 
innovations that suggest its theories may be incomplete or wrong� 
Systems of denial cause organizations to persist in their comfortable assump-
tions, despite evidence that the world is changing and that these changes may be 
dangerous� The systems of denial—killing the messenger, questioning the data, 
and resisting refutation through constant theoretical change—are powerful ways 
in which organizations ignore inconvenient information� Overcoming them de-
mands that a leader focus on the counterfactual work of organizational change—
understanding what is not happening and which possibilities are not being 
discovered, explored, developed, evaluated, or implemented—and why it is not 
happening� This requires understanding how inconvenient facts are resisted and 
developing a strategy for overcoming that resistance� As military leaders pursue 
initiatives that increase sensitivity to new conditions in the external environment, 
as they encourage experimentation, and as they invest attention and resources in 
developing new theories, they will find that the system of denial gives way to a 
different system—one of learning, of insight and foresight, and of change� This 
is the way of progress�
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